Aggregators and the News Industry: Charging for Access to Content by Rutt, James
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #11-19 
 
October 2011 
 
Aggregators and the News Industry: Charging for Access to Content 
 
James Rutt 
University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) 
Institute, http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on 
network industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual 
networks” comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating 
system, and on network issues in general. 
Aggregators and the News Industry: Charging
for Access to Content
James Rutt∗
October 1, 2011
Abstract
The Internet has drastically altered the nature of competition in
the news industry. This article develops a model of price and quality
competition between firms in the online news industry. In equilibrium,
firms randomise in their pricing strategies and this generates the cross-
sectional mixture of advertiser and subscription funded models we ob-
serve. The model also plausibly explains why pricing strategies differ
across content areas. Finally, an important part of my explanation
is that aggregators, such as Google and Digg.com, allow consumers
to search amongst articles and direct consumers towards high quality
articles. The model’s results have implications for the ongoing public
debate about the effects of aggregators on the news industry; although
aggregators may harm firms, consumers may benefit.
Keywords: Internet, Newspapers, Aggregators, Paywalls.
JEL Classification: L11, L13, L82
1 Introduction
Twenty years ago, geographic barriers in the oﬄine news industry meant that
an individual in the U.K. had a choice between a relatively small number of
∗Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. Email: jmr81@cam.ac.uk. I thank
Sanjeev Goyal, my supervisor, for his detailed comments; Aytek Erdil, Rupert Gatti and
Pushmeet Kohli for their advice; and seminar participants at Microsoft Research, Cam-
bridge and the University of Cambridge for helpful comments. I am also grateful to the
ESRC and the NET Institute (www.NETinst.org) for financial support.
1
domestic news providers. The Internet has eroded these geographic barriers,
and today, the same individual can easily access any English language news
website in the world. As a result, it is estimated that 73% of the Daily Mail ’s
online readers are from outside of the U.K. (OECD (2010)). Meanwhile, the
Guardian has more online readers in the U.S. than the Los Angeles Times
(Lanchester (2010)).
The Internet has also changed the way in which news is consumed. Oﬄine,
consumers tend to purchase a single newspaper. The newspaper is a bundled
product collecting together articles covering a number of topics. A consumer
interested in a single article has to purchase the entire newspaper, regardless
of whether they are interested in the other articles. Bundling the product
provides firms with more scope for horizontal differentiation and such models
have traditionally been used to examine competition in the media industry
(e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005) and Gabszewicz et al. (2001)).
Online, it is easier for consumers to personalise their coverage and to
switch between providers (Lanchester (2010)). This has meant that the tra-
ditional newspaper has been unbundled. Online, articles are consumed as
individual products and consumers might use one site for sports coverage,
another for business news and yet another for entertainment news. Generally,
firms are less able to horizontally differentiate individual articles. Instead,
vertical differentiation becomes more important and this is the focus of this
article.
An important facilitator of these changes has been the rise of online news
aggregators such as Google News and Digg.com. These sites allow consumers
to identify high quality articles and stories of interest. Such services are be-
coming an increasingly important source of consumers for firms. For example,
in 2006 it was estimated that 20 percent of visitors to news websites came
via Google and a further 7 percent came via Yahoo (Newspaper Association
of America (2007)). By 2009 between one third and one half of visitors to
five of America’s major newspapers arrived via Yahoo, Microsoft or Google
(Weir (2010)).1
These developments have posed firms a number of challenges. In particu-
lar, there is much debate over how firms should price access to their articles
online:
“For every outfit that is trying to build a premium subscription
1The newspapers were The Washington Post, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times,
USA Today and The Wall Street Journal.
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service, another is becoming more convinced of the virtues of
giving away free content.” (The Economist (2010))
One group of firms (e.g. the Daily Mail, the Guardian, and CNN ) are ag-
gressively expanding their websites and providing all of their articles for free.
These firms appear to believe that an advertiser funded model is feasible so
long as sufficient scale is achieved. Conversely, another group of firms are
erecting paywalls and charging for access to their articles (e.g. The Times,
The Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times and The New York Times).
These paywalls take a variety of forms. The Times and The Sunday Times
take an extreme position. These firms charge for access to all of their arti-
cles and even block search engines from listing their articles amongst search
results. A more common model is to have some form of metered paywall,
as pioneered by the Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal. These
firms allow visitors to view certain articles (e.g. general news articles but
not editorials) or a certain number of articles for free, within a given time
period, before charging for any further access.
The first part of this article develops a model of price and quality com-
petition in the market for an individual news article. To do this I utilise
a methodology commonly used to analyse price dispersion in homogeneous
good markets (see Varian (1980) and Baye and Morgan (2001), amongst oth-
ers). In the model there are two types of consumer: loyal consumers and
searchers. Loyal consumers only consider the articles produced by one firm
and are willing to pay to access that firm’s articles. Searchers have no ex
ante preferences over firms and are assumed to be fully informed about the
quality of the articles provided by different firms because they use an aggre-
gator to search amongst the available providers. However, it is assumed that
searchers are not willing to pay to access an article. As a result searchers
select the firm providing the highest quality article which is free to access.
These assumptions about consumer behaviour are consistent with the
following evidence. Firstly, in 2010, 64 percent of visitors to the top twenty-
five US news websites averaged only 1 visit per month to a particular site
(Pew Research Center (2011)). So, many consumers are not loyal to any
specific firm. Secondly, Athey et al. (2011) find that the concentration of
a user’s consumption amongst different websites is strongly and negatively
correlated to their frequency of using Google or Bing news. Thus, consumers
who switch between firms use aggregators to search amongst firms. Thirdly, a
Pew Research Center survey found that 82% of consumers said they would use
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another firm if their favourite firm began charging for access to their articles
(Pew Research Center (2010)). Hence, many consumers do not consider using
firms who charge for access to their articles. Fourthly, some firms, such as
The Times, have erected paywalls which prevent aggregators from displaying
the articles of those firms.
Thus, in my model, searchers are those consumers who are unwilling to
pay for the article and who use an aggregator to search and switch amongst
the providers. Meanwhile, loyal consumers can be thought of as regular news
readers who always use the same newspaper website.
Given the behaviour of consumers, firms simultaneously decide on their
price and quality investments. Firms can charge advertisers to display ad-
vertisements alongside their articles. As a result, firms receive revenue for
every consumer who reads their article regardless of their pricing strategy.
Firms face a trade-off in their pricing strategy between earning sales rev-
enue from loyal consumers and losing potential advertising revenue from
searchers. I show that this trade-off leads to a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, firms randomise between providing the
article for free and charging for access to the article. There is a unique level
of quality provided by firms who charge for access to the article. However,
there is a distribution of quality levels for articles which are free to access.
The model’s equilibrium is consistent with several characteristics of the
online news industry. Firstly, in equilibrium firms randomise in their pricing
decisions and quality investments. This endogenously generates the cross-
sectional mixture of pricing strategies we observe and also generates quality
dispersion across, ex ante identical, firms. Additionally, in a dynamic setting,
the symmetric equilibrium’s strategy can be interpreted in terms of a metered
paywall, in which firms sometimes charge for access to their articles, whilst
providing free access at other times. Over time, as firms randomise between
providing their articles for free and charging for access to their articles, this
generates the temporal variation in pricing strategies we observe by some
firms who use such metered paywalls.
Secondly, it is never an equilibrium for every firm to provide their article
for free with certainty. This result arises because, when all firms provide
their article for free, the behaviour of the searchers creates a Bertrand effect
which erodes away profits. This is consistent with recent changes in the pric-
ing strategies used by firms. Until recently, the predominant online business
model has been for every firm to provide free access to their articles. This
period has coincided with firms investing heavily in their websites and the
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quantity and variety of the content they provide. However, there has been a
recent movement away from this strategy. Firms have struggled to be prof-
itable and several firms, most notably Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation,
have claimed that a universal free content model is unsustainable.
Thirdly, it is clear that strategies differ across content areas. For example,
the vast majority of entertainment news is available for free online whereas
consumers are often charged for access to financial news. In particular, it is
usually claimed that the paywalls of the Financial Times and The Wall Street
Journal have been successful because these firms have few direct competitors
and many loyal consumers who value the articles these firms provide highly
(Lanchester (2010)). I show that my model’s predictions are consistent with
these claims.
The second part of this article focuses on the model’s welfare implications.
In particular, I focus on how changes in certain parameters affect the expected
quality of free articles and consumer welfare. These results provide insights
into how aggregators affect the quality of articles, online pricing strategies,
firm profits and consumer welfare.
The effects of aggregators on the news industry has received much atten-
tion in the popular press (e.g. The Economist (2009)) and in policy circles
(e.g. OECD (2010) and Kirchhoff (2010)). This debate has generally fo-
cussed on the detrimental effects aggregators are believed to have on firm
profitability and the quality provision of firms who charge for access to their
articles.
My model agrees with the popular claim that aggregators reduce the
profitability of firms and the quality levels provided by firms who charge
for access to their articles. However, the model also highlights the potential
benefits aggregators can bring consumers. For example, as more consumers
use the aggregator, firms increase the propensity with which they provide
their article for free and the expected quality of a free article also increases.
These results imply that a loyal consumer’s expected utility increases as more
consumers use the aggregator. Additionally, I show that it is possible for the
expected quality level of a free article to exceed the first best level chosen
by a social planner maximising the sum of firm profits and consumer utility.
These possibilities have received little attention in the existing literature.
I proceed, in Section 2, by discussing the relationship between this article
and the existing literature. Section 3 sets up the model and Section 4 presents
the model’s symmetric equilibrium. Section 5 discusses the comparative stat-
ics for this equilibrium and analyses how the parameters of the model affect
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quality investments for free articles and consumer welfare. Section 6 dis-
cusses the model, offering some interpretations of the results and outlining
some extensions to the basic framework. Section 7 concludes. Finally, an
appendix presents some of the longer proofs.
2 Related Literature
The existing literature analysing the impact of the Internet on the news in-
dustry focuses on a variety of issues including: the implications of online news
for oﬄine newspapers (Gentzkow (2007)) and the implications of the Inter-
net for firms who rely on advertising for their funding (Athey et al. (2011),
Athey and Gans (2010) and Bergemann and Bonatti (2010)). This article
contributes to this literature by focussing on the determinants of a firm’s on-
line pricing strategy and quality investments and the impact of aggregators
on the news industry.
Much of the discussion concerning the online news industry focuses on
how the Internet and especially online aggregators affect the quality of the
news provided. However, the media industry has traditionally been analysed
using models of horizontal differentiation (e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005)
and Gabszewicz et al. (2001)). Such models are not well suited to addressing
the questions concerning product quality which arise in the online news in-
dustry. Therefore, I develop a model of price and quality competition in the
online news industry using the methodology widely used to model price dis-
persion in the market for a homogeneous good (e.g. Varian (1980) and Baye
and Morgan (2001)). This article’s contribution is to apply this methodology
in a new setting, whose structure is designed to reflect the features of the
online news industry. This permits an analysis of how specific features of
the industry, such as aggregators, affect the strategies and profits of firms
and the implications for consumer welfare. However, in keeping with the
price dispersion literature, firms face the following trade-off which drives the
results.
A firm can choose to act as a local monopolist and serve a small set of
loyal consumers. Alternatively, a firm can attempt to attract a larger group
of consumers, but only if the firm exposes itself to competition from other
firms. Thus, firms must trade-off lost revenue from their loyal consumers
with the potential revenue they could gain if they compete with other firms
and attract the larger group of consumers. This trade-off leads to a mixed
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strategy equilibrium, which generates heterogeneity in pricing decisions and
quality investments across, ex ante identical, firms.
A notable feature of many media industries is the presence of heterogene-
ity in pricing strategies across firms. This heterogeneity in pricing strategies
is particularly stark in the online news industry. We regularly observe some
firms charging for access to articles, as other firms rely on advertising revenue
and provide essentially the same article for free.
Several papers have drawn on the two-sided markets literature to compare
the strategies of firms when they are forced to rely solely on advertising
revenues and when they are free to charge subscription prices (e.g. Anderson
and Coate (2005) and Crampes et al. (2009)). However, the majority of this
literature has not tried to explain why we observe cross-sectional variation
in pricing strategies across competing firms. An exception is the work of
Ambrus and Reisinger (2006). However, Ambrus and Reisinger use a model
of horizontal differentiation and focus on the broadcasting industry and the
implications of multi-homing consumers for advertising revenues. In contrast,
I focus on the online news industry and my model generates cross-sectional
heterogeneity in pricing strategies within a model of vertical differentiation.
The economics literature has mainly focussed on price aggregators (e.g.
Baye and Morgan (2001), Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) and Ellison and
Ellison (2009)). To my knowledge, only Dellarocas et al. (2010) and Katona
and Sarvary (2008) have considered the effects of aggregators on the news in-
dustry or content providers. Katona and Sarvary’s analysis suggests that ag-
gregators encourage firms to specialise in specific content areas. Meanwhile,
Dellarocas et al. focus on how aggregators can free-ride on the content pro-
vided by firms and how this effects the hyperlinking and content investment
decisions of firms.
This article addresses a different set of issues by considering how aggre-
gators affect the pricing decisions of firms and the quality of articles they
provide. In particular, my model emphasises the contrasting effects that ag-
gregators have on the quality of an article depending on the pricing strategy
the firm follows. The existing literature focuses exclusively on the effects of
aggregators on firms. In contrast, my approach allows a consideration of how
aggregators affect consumers. As a result, I am able to provide a more gen-
eral welfare analysis than has been attempted in previous research. I show
that, although aggregators may reduce the profitability of firms, consumers
may benefit.
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3 Model
A continuum of consumers of unit mass consume a vertically differentiated
news article. The utility of a consumer from an article of quality x pur-
chased at a price p is given by U(x, p) = δu(x) − p. δ > 0 reflects the
intensity of preferences and will be interpreted as the willingness to pay of
consumers. I assume that u(0) = 0, u′(·) ≥ 0, u′′(·) ≤ 0, limx→0 u′(x) > 0
and limx→∞ u′(x) = 0.
Consumers are one of two types; a proportion µ are searchers and 1−µ are
loyal consumers. Loyal consumers are only aware of one firm. Equivalently,
these consumers have a single most preferred firm and do not consider the
articles of other firms to be substitutable for the article of their most preferred
firm. Additionally, loyal consumers are willing to pay to access this firm’s
article, subject to a participation constraint. Finally, these consumers are
uniformly distributed across the n firms, so each firm has 1−µ
n
loyal consumers.
Searchers are fully informed about the quality levels provided by different
firms. However, searchers are assumed not to be willing to pay to access the
article. As searchers have no ex ante preferences over firms, they access the
highest quality article provided for free. For now, I assume that µ ∈ (0, 1) is
exogenously given. I will discuss this assumption and the assumption that
loyal consumers are uniformly distributed across firms in Section 6.
As was discussed in Section 1, these assumptions are consistent with
several features of the online news industry. Firstly, loyal consumers can
be thought of as regular news readers. It seems likely that regular readers
are conscious of any horizontal differentiation between firms and it may be
an important consideration in their choice of firm. This is consistent with
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010)’s findings that some consumers prefer to read
news which confirms their pre-existing views and biases.
Secondly, many consumers are casual consumers, who only use any given
firm infrequently and who switch between firms regularly. These casual read-
ers are a significant source of traffic, and thus potential revenue, to firms. In
this model these casual readers are the searchers. At the level of an individ-
ual article vertical differentiation becomes more important when attracting
consumers. As a result, the searchers focus on quality in their choice of firm.
Thirdly, evidence suggests that consumers who switch between firms use
aggregators to identify articles of interest. Therefore, we might imagine that
searchers are aware of the variability in quality across firms because they use
an aggregator to search amongst the available providers. In this interpreta-
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tion µ captures the importance of the aggregator. As µ increases a greater
proportion of consumers are searchers and use the aggregator to search for
articles.
Fourthly, most consumers are unwilling to pay to access an article and
will switch to another firm. Additionally, the paywalls of some firms, such
as The Times, prevent aggregators from displaying their articles in search
results. As a result, searchers do not to consider firms who charge for access
to their articles.
Given the behaviour of consumers, the n firms simultaneously decide what
subscription price (pi for firm i) to set and the quality investment (xi for firm
i) to make, at a cost c(γxi). I assume that c(0) = 0, c
′(·) ≥ 0, c′′(·) ≥ 0,
limx→0 c′(x) = 0 and limx→∞ c′(x) = ∞. γ is used to analyse an increase in
costs. The quality of an article, x might be determined by the quantity of
coverage, the amount of critical analysis and so forth.
Finally, firms can display advertisements alongside their articles. Thus,
a firm earns advertising revenue, β, from every consumer who reads their
article. This advertising revenue is assumed to be constant and indepen-
dent of the firms pricing strategy. Suppose that advertising is informative,
creating product awareness and allowing the products of advertisers to be
matched with consumers. Each advertiser has a constant valuation ν of an
impression to a consumer. ν is distributed according to G(ν) on [0, ν¯] across
the advertisers. An advertiser with value ν purchases an impression at firm
i if ν − φi ≥ 0, where φi is the per impression advertising price of firm i. If
advertisers can only purchase adverts at the firms, and not the aggregator,
then each firm has monopoly power over access to every consumer reading
its article. The firm’s advertising demand function is ai(φi) = 1 − G(φi).
Thus, all firms will charge the same per impression advertising price (φ∗)
which maximises φi(1 − G(φi)). A sufficient condition for φ∗ to be unique
is that 1−G(ν) is log-concave (Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)). Thus, each
firm earns the same per consumer advertising revenue, β = φ∗(1−G(φ∗)).2
2Alternatively, advertisers might be able to advertise at both the firms and the aggre-
gator. This provides advertisers with two opportunities to reach searchers, but only one
opportunity to reach loyal consumers. However, if consumers can be perfectly tracked
across sites, then firms can price discriminate based on consumer type. This results in two
advertising prices, one for searchers and one for loyal consumers, but does not alter any
of the analysis.
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4 Analysis
I focus on the existence and properties of the unique symmetric Nash equi-
librium of this model. In this equilibrium every firm provides their article for
free with probability α∗. Those firms who charge for access to their article se-
lect a unique quality level, x∗M , and those firms providing free access to their
article select a quality level from a distribution F (·). The possibility and
some implications of asymmetric equilibria are discussed further in Section
6.3
To solve for the symmetric equilibrium consider the decision of a single
firm assuming that all other firms follow the symmetric strategy described
by α∗, x∗M and F (·). Suppose that the firm decides to charge for access to
their article. In this case the firm only attracts their loyal consumers and
maximises:
max
pi>0,xi≥0
piM(xi, pi) =
β(1− µ)
n
+
(1− µ)
n
pi − c(γxi)
s.t. U(xi, pi) = δu(xi)− pi ≥ 0
β(1−µ)
n
is the exogenous advertising revenue from these customers, (1−µ)
n
pi
is the sales revenue earned when charging pi for access to the article and
c(γxi) is the cost of providing the quality level x. It is clear that the partic-
ipation constraint must bind so that pi = δu(xi). Thus:
Lemma 1. The profit maxisimising quality level is x∗M such that:
(1− µ)δ
n
u′(x∗M) = γc
′(γx∗M) (1)
The associated profit maximising price and profits are:
pM = δu(x
∗
M) (2)
piM(x
∗
M) =
β(1− µ)
n
+
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)− c(γx∗M) (3)
Existence and uniqueness of x∗M > 0 is ensured because the left hand side
of (1) is monotonically decreasing with x from above 0 and the right hand
3The symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for n = 2.
10
side is monotonically increasing with x from 0. Additionally, the second order
condition holds from concavity of u(·) and convexity of c(·).
Now consider the expected profit of a firm which provides free access to
its article and makes a quality investment of x, given that the other firms are
following the symmetric strategy. This firm earns β(1−µ)
n
in exogenous revenue
from their loyal consumers. The cost of the quality investment x is c(γx).
The expected revenue from searchers when x is chosen is
∑n−1
j=0
(
n−1
j
)
αj(1−
α)n−1−jF (x)jβµ. βµ is the exogenous revenue the firm earns if the searchers
select their article. This occurs when the firm has the highest quality article
of all firms who do not charge for access to their article. The probability that
j firms, other than i, decide not to charge is
(
n−1
j
)
αj(1−α)n−1−j. As quality
investments are independently drawn from a common distribution F (·), the
probability that x is higher than that of the other j firms is F (x)j. Summing
over all possible j gives the expected probability that firm i is used by the
searchers given x, α∗ and F (·). So:
E[pii(x)] =
[
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
αj(1− α)n−1−jF (x)jβµ
]
+
β(1− µ)
n
− c(γx)
= βµ[1− α(1− F (x))]n−1 + β(1− µ)
n
− c(γx) (4)
There are two possible types of equilibrium. In the first, firms play a
mixed strategy in their pricing decision, α∗ ∈ (0, 1). In the second, all firms
play a pure strategy and either charge or don’t charge for access to their
article, α∗ = {0, 1}. I begin by focussing on the former.
When firms randomise in their pricing decision they must be indifferent
between charging and not charging. Additionally, as is standard in this class
of model, firm’s providing free access to their article select a quality invest-
ment from a continuous distribution, F (·). The intuition is well understood.
Suppose all other firms choose the same quality level x when they provide
free access to their article. Then a firm could provide x +  and guarantee
that the searchers select their article when the firm provides it for free. This
causes a discrete jump in the firm’s expected revenue relative to the choice
of x but only a marginal increase in cost. Thus, expected profits increase
and the deviation is profitable. As a result, firms must be randomising in
their quality choices. Now suppose that there was a gap in the support of
F (·) between x1 and x2, with x1 < x2. Then a quality level x2 −  > x1
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would increase profits because the cost of providing this quality level would
be strictly lower than for x2 but F (x2 − ) = F (x2), so the expected rev-
enue would be the same. Thus, the distribution must be continuous. Varian
(1980) provides a formal proof of these arguments.
For F (·) to be part of an equilibrium it must be that a firm providing free
access to their article cannot increase their profit by deviating and selecting a
quality level from outside of this distribution. Thus, the following conditions
must hold:
E[pi(x)] = E[pi(x′)] ∀x, x′ ∈ supp(F (·)) (5)
E[pi(x)] = piM(x
∗
M) ∀x ∈ supp(F (·)) (6)
E[pi(x)] > E[pi(x′)] ∀x ∈ supp(F (·)) and x′ 6∈ supp(F (·)) (7)
Let x = inf(supp(F (·))) and x¯ = sup(supp(F (·))). Assuming an equi-
librium exists (3), (4), condition (6) and F (x) = 0 can be used to solve for
α∗.
α∗ = 1−
(
1
βµ
(
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) + c(γx)− c(γx∗M)
)) 1
n−1
(8)
Then (4), condition (6) and (8) yield a potential distribution, F (x).
1− F (x) = 1
α∗
(
1−
(
1
βµ
(
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) + c(γx)− c(γx∗M)
)) 1
n−1
)
(9)
It can easily be verified that F (x) = 0 and that F (x) is increasing with
x. Additionally, profits are equal ∀x ∈ supp(F (·)) by construction. It must
then be the case that no firm can benefit by selecting a quality level from
outside this distribution (condition (7)). It is clear that a firm choosing
x > x¯ will earn lower expected profits.4 This final requirement also implies
that x = 0. Suppose x > 0 then a firm providing free access to their article
could strictly increase its profits by selecting x < x. The probability that
the searchers select the firm’s article is the same and so the expected rev-
enue, remains unchanged. However, the cost is strictly lower, so profits must
4As the probability of being the highest quality provider remains the same but the cost
of providing quality x > x¯ is greater. Thus, E[pi(x¯)] > E[pi(x)] ∀x > x¯.
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strictly increase. The only possible x for which this argument does not apply
is x = 0.
Using (9) and F (x¯) = 1, it is possible to derive the upper bound of the
quality distribution:
x¯ =
1
γ
c−1
(
βµ+ c(γx∗M)−
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)
)
(10)
Using x = 0 and c(0) = 0:
α∗ = 1−
(
1
βµ
(
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)− c(γx∗M)
)) 1
n−1
(11)
Finally, we require that α∗ ∈ (0, 1) and x¯ > 0. Manipulating (10) and
(11) it can be shown that α∗ > 0 and x¯ > 0 both require that:
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)− c(γx∗M) < βµ (12)
Intuitively, this requires that when there is no probability of another firm
providing free access to their article, then a firm finds it profitable to provide
free access to their article and make a quality investment of 0. α∗ < 1 requires
that:
c(γx∗M) <
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) (13)
So it must be the case that charging for access to their article and provid-
ing the profit maximising level of quality creates positive net profits for the
firm. The conditions imposed on c(·) and u(·) ensure that this is the case.
Now consider the possibility of an equilibrium in which firms pursue a
pure pricing strategy. Firstly, there cannot be an equilibrium in which every
firm provides free access to their article with certainty, α∗ = 1. To see
this, suppose that every firm were to provide free access to their article with
certainty. As searchers only select the highest quality article, there is a classic
Bertrand effect as quality levels are bid up to the point at which expected
profits are zero. However, a firm can always make a strictly positive profit
by charging for access to its article. Thus, it cannot be an equilibrium for
every firm to provide access to their article for free with certainty.
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This result is consistent with recent developments in the news industry.
Whilst most content has been provided for free, firms have invested heavily
in the scale and the scope of their websites. At the same time firms have
struggled to be profitable and this has led a number of firms to begin charging
for access to their articles. In this model searchers are informed about the
quality levels provided by firms because they use an aggregator. Thus, the
model suggests that aggregators have driven this effect, creating excessive
competition between firms when they use a universal free access model.
On the other hand, an equilibrium in which no firm provides access to
their article for free (α∗ = 0) is possible. In this case it must be that, when
no other firm provides free access to their article, a single firm does not want
to switch to providing their article for free with a zero quality level.5 This
requires that:
pi(x∗M) ≥
β(1− µ)
n
+ βµ
⇒ (1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)− c(γx∗M) ≥ βµ (14)
This is the opposite condition to that required for α∗ > 0 and x¯ >
0. Intuitively, when the searchers are not a sufficiently attractive source of
revenue every firm charges for access to their article and makes a quality
investment defined by (1).
4.1 Equilibrium
The following proposition summarises the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium:
i If (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) − c(γx∗M) < βµ then each firm provides free access to
their article with probability
α∗ = 1−
(
1
βµ
(
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)− c(γx∗M)
)) 1
n−1
5The optimal quality choice is zero because when the firm is the only one providing
their article for free they always attracts the searchers and the revenue earned from this
traffic is independent of the quality level. However, investing in quality is costly, thus it
is optimal to set x = 0.
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If (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) − c(γx∗M) ≥ βµ then every firm charges for access to
their article and α∗ = 0.
ii When a firm charges for access to their article, they set a price pM =
δu(x∗M), and selects a quality level x
∗
M where x
∗
M is implicitly defined
by (1−µ)δ
n
u′(x∗M) = γc
′(γx∗M).
iii When a firm does not charge for its article, they selects a quality level
from the distribution:
1− F (x) = 1
α∗
(
1−
(
1
βµ
(
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) + c(γx)− c(γx∗M)
)) 1
n−1
)
on [0,x¯] where
x¯ =
1
γ
c−1
(
βµ+ c(γxM)− (1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M)
)
iv Each firm earns expected profit E(pi(x)) = β(1−µ)
n
+ (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) −
c(γx∗M)
Thus, in equilibrium, firms either never provide the article for free or
randomise between free access to the article and charging for the article.
Firms charging for their article will provide the same quality level, whereas
there will be a range of quality levels for the free articles. Sometimes a
firm providing free access to their article might invest heavily in an article,
providing detailed analysis, commentary and background information. In
other cases they might only provide a small amount of coverage, for example
only reporting basic information about an article.
Randomisation by firms in their pricing strategies generates the cross-
sectional mixture in pricing strategies we observe in the online news industry,
with some firms charging for similar articles to those being provided for free
by others. Although the model is static, it is not uncommon to interpret
this class of model as a repeated game in which the behaviour of the agents
is fairly predictable, so that the dynamic aspects of the game are less im-
portant (Rosenthal (1980)). Taking this approach, suppose that articles are
constantly arriving. Firms must make decisions as to whether to charge for
access to each article and the quality of coverage to provide. In this case α∗
is the proportion of all articles that a firm provides for free. The equilibrium
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can then be interpreted in terms of a metered paywall where firms provide
access to some of their articles for free but charge for access to others.
However, the model faces the problem commonly encountered when in-
terpreting this class of model and relating the equilibrium strategy to ob-
served behaviour.6 In practice, some firms use metered paywalls and pricing
strategies which allow consumers access to some articles but not to others.
One might claim that these strategies have some similarities to the equilib-
rium strategies described above. However, most firms follow a strategy of
always providing their articles for free or always charging for their articles.
In this model, the behaviour of searchers means that there is no equilibrium
in which more than one firm always provides access to their article for free.
Thus, although the symmetric equilibrium can generate the observed cross-
sectional mixture of pricing strategies, it does not accurately describe the
pricing strategies we observe in practice.
5 Comparative Statics and Welfare
The initial comparative static results for the symmetric Nash equilibrium
are:7
Proposition 2.
i The quality level provided by firms who charge for access to their article,
x∗M , is decreasing with the proportion of searchers, µ, is independent of
advertising revenues, β, and is increasing with consumer valuation of
content, δ.
ii The probability with which firms provide their article for free, α∗, is
increasing with β and with µ but decreasing with δ.
iii The expected profit of a firm, E[pi(x)], is decreasing with µ but is in-
creasing with β and δ.
Proof. See appendix.
6Baye et al. (2004), discuss these issues in the pricing literature.
7For completeness the comparative static results for x¯ and the parameters n and γ are
collected in the appendix.
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Thus, when a greater proportion of consumers are searchers (µ increases),
the value of advertising (β) increases or the willingness to pay of consumers
(δ) decreases we would expect an increase in the propensity of firms to provide
their article for free. Intuitively, as the potential value of attracting the
searchers increases, firms increase the propensity with which they provide free
access to their article, α∗. Additionally, as β and µ increase and δ decreases
the condition for α∗ > 0 is more likely to be satisfied.8 The proportion of
searchers, µ, can be interpreted as measuring the importance of aggregators
as a source of consumers. Thus, as the importance of the aggregator increases
we would expect an increase in the proportion of articles provided for free.
As would be expected the quality investment of a firm charging for access
to its article, x∗M , is decreasing with µ, is independent of β but is increasing
with δ. Intuitively, x∗M is increasing with factors which increase the value of
a firm’s loyal consumers. Finally, the expected profit of a firm is decreasing
with µ but increasing with β and with δ. If a parameter change decreases
the potential profits from charging loyal consumers, then firms increase the
propensity with which they provide their article for free. This fuels the com-
petition effect which reduces the expected profit when providing the article
for free. These results are consistent with the argument that aggregators
have reduced the profitability of firms and decreased the quality level of ar-
ticles firms provide when they charge for access in the online news industry
(e.g. Kirchhoff (2010) and OECD (2010)).
5.1 Quality Levels of Free Articles
How do the quality levels chosen by firms charging for access to their ar-
ticle compare to the quality levels of free articles? How do changes in key
variables, in particular the share of consumers who are searchers (µ), affect
the equilibrium level of quality provision and consumer welfare? Answering
these questions will provide insights into the welfare effects of aggregators in
the online news industry.
I begin by comparing free article quality investments with the quality
investments of firms who charge. The factors driving the choice of quality
investment are rather different in each case. Firms who charge for their
articles have an incentive to increase their quality investment in order to
8As βµ is increasing with µ and β and independent of δ and (1−µ)δn u(x
∗
M )− c(γx∗M ) is
decreasing with µ and increasing with δ and independent of β.
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extract more surplus from their loyal consumers. However, these consumers
are captive, so the firm faces no competitive pressure. On the other hand,
firms providing their article for free have an incentive to invest in quality to
ensure that they are the highest quality provider and attract the searchers.
For certain parameter values there is no probability that firms providing
the article for free will offer a higher quality level than those provided by
firms who charge (i.e. when x∗M ≥ x¯). From (10) x¯ > x∗M ⇐⇒ βµ >
(1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M). This is a stricter condition than that required for α
∗ > 0. As
would be expected, x∗M is more likely to lie in the distribution when the value
of attracting the searchers is large and less likely when the value of a firm’s
loyal consumers is large. This result also implies that there will be a range of
parameters in which firms charging for access to their article provide a higher
quality level than the expected quality level provided by those not charging.
The expected quality investment of a free article is:
xˆ =
∫ x¯
0
xf(x)dx
= x¯−
∫ x¯
0
F (x)dx (15)
It appears that no closed form solution exists for (15) which allows com-
parisons to be made between xˆ and x∗M . An exception is the duopoly
case of the model with linear utility (δu(xi) = δxi) and quadratic costs
(c(γxi) =
γx2i
2
). This example illustrates that it is possible for the expected
quality level of a free article to be above, as well as below, the quality level
firms charge for. In this case:
x∗M =
(1− µ)δ
2γ
xˆ =
(8βµγ − (1− µ)2δ2) 12
3γ
α∗ > 0 ⇒ βµ > (1− µ)
2δ2
8γ
xˆ > x∗M ⇒ βµ >
(1− µ)2δ2
8γ
13
4
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So it is possible that x∗M < xˆ and this is more likely when consumers have
a low valuation of quality (small δ), when quality investments are cheap
(small γ) and when the revenue earned by attracting the searchers is large
(µ and β are large).
More generally, it is possible to describe how the free quality distribution
changes with the key parameters of the model.
Proposition 3.
i If µ′ > µ then the distribution F (x;µ′) first order stochastically domi-
nates the distribution F (x;µ). Thus xˆ(µ′) > xˆ(µ).
ii If β′ > β then the distribution F (x; β′) first order stochastically domi-
nates the distribution F (x; β). Thus xˆ(β′) > xˆ(β).
iii If δ′ > δ then the distribution F (x; δ) first order stochastically domi-
nates the distribution F (x; δ′). Thus xˆ(δ) > xˆ(δ′).
Proof. See appendix.
Intuitively, these effects result from the competition effect, as each param-
eter affects the probability with which an article is provided for free (α∗). For
example, as µ increases a higher proportion of consumers are searchers. This
increases the incentives firms have to provide their article for free (α∗ in-
creases) and this increases competition for the searchers. This leads firms
to increase their quality investment when they provide their article for free
and this increases the expected quality investment for a free article. These
results are in sharp contrast to the effects of δ and µ on the quality provided
by firms when they charge for access to their article (x∗M).
Proposition 3 implies that aggregators have important effects on the qual-
ity of articles provided online. If quantity and depth of coverage are impor-
tant determinants of quality, then the result is consistent with the rapid ex-
pansion of websites and free content offerings by a number of news providers
in recent years as aggregators (µ) and online advertising revenues (β) have
grown in importance.
5.2 Welfare Implications
Proposition 3 also has implications for consumer welfare. Consider the ex-
pected utility of a loyal consumer. With probability (1− α∗) this consumer
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must pay for the article, in which case their full surplus is extracted. How-
ever, with probability α∗ they do not have to pay in which case their expected
utility is δE[u(x)], where E[u(x)] =
∫ x¯
0
u(x)f(x)dx. Thus, a loyal consumer’s
expected utility is E[Uloyal] = α
∗δE[u(x)].
It is the case that:
Proposition 4. The expected utility of a loyal consumer is increasing with
the fraction of consumers using the aggregator, µ, and the per consumer
advertising revenue, β.9
Proof. This result follows immediately from Propositions 2 and 3.
Propositions 3 and 4 have important implications for the current policy
debate over whether high quality and pluralistic news provision can be left to
market forces (e.g. OECD (2010), Kirchhoff (2010)). This debate emphasises
the role that a healthy and independent press plays in the democratic process.
In particular, there is a worry that firms will no longer be able to provide a
critical analysis of government policy and the activities of businesses. It has
been argued that lower quality news will be provided and that high quality
news might increasingly be restricted to the few individuals who can afford
to pay for it.
Much of the popular debate and existing research (e.g. The Economist
(2009) and Dellarocas et al. (2010)) has focussed on the negative effects free
news provision and aggregators are believed to have had on firm profitability
and quality provision. In contrast, this model emphasises that consumers
may benefit from using aggregators, even if the quality of the articles some
firms provide falls. Here, as is commonly argued, an increase in the impor-
tance of the aggregator, µ, reduces both the profits of firms and the quality
level provided by firms who charge for access to their articles. However, as
described above, an increase in the use of aggregators by consumers increases
competition between firms and increases the expected quality level of an ar-
ticle provided for free. This leads to an increase in a consumer’s expected
utility. The searchers create an externality, by encouraging some firms to
9It is not possible to provide a similar result for the expected utility of a searcher.
Although, analogous results hold for the expected utility of a searcher conditional on j
firms providing an article for free, the complication is that the probability that j firms
provide their article for free also changes. This latter effect may be such that the expected
utility of a searcher actually decreases with µ and with β.
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provide free access to their articles, which benefits loyal consumers. This
possibility has received little attention in the current literature.
Additionally, the value of online advertising revenues have been increasing
over time and are expected to continue do so, partly as a result of better tar-
geting and matching of consumers with advertisers (The Economist (2011)).
If this is the case, then Propositions 2, 3 and 4 imply that we should expect
to see increases in expected profits, in the expected quality level of a free ar-
ticle and in consumer utility. This could help alleviate some of the concerns
currently being expressed by policymakers and firms.
Finally, it is possible to show that, if the proportion of consumers who
use the aggregator is sufficiently large, then the expected quality level of a
free article could even exceed the first best level chosen by a social planner
to maximise the sum of firm profits and consumer welfare. Suppose that
the social planner is free to decide which firms consumers use. Then, in the
first-best, the social planner sends all consumers to a single firm, which has
a 0 price and only that firm produces a positive quality level. To see this,
suppose that this were not the case and that two or more firms produced a
positive quality level. Without loss of generality suppose that firm i has the
(weakly) highest quality level. Then, social welfare can be (weakly) increased
by transferring all consumers to firm i. As quality investments are costly,
social welfare can be increased further by reducing all quality investments at
firms other than i to 0. Prices are only a transfer between consumers and
firms, and searchers only participate if at least one price is 0. As a result the
first best price is 0.
Thus, all consumer’s participate and the social planner sets xi to max-
imise:
SW = β + δu(xi)− c(γxi)
and xFB is such that δu
′(xFB) = γc′(γxFB). It is immediately clear that
the quality level provided by a firm charging for access to their article is
always below the first best. However, this may not necessarily be the case
for the expected quality level of a free article. To see this consider the linear
utility, quadratic cost example discussed earlier. In this case:
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xFB =
δ
γ
xˆ =
(8βµγ − (1− µ)2δ2) 12
3γ
α∗ > 0 ⇒ βµ > (1− µ)
2δ2
8γ
xˆ > xFB ⇒ βµ > (1− µ)
2δ2
8γ
+
9δ2
8γ
Once again the intuition is that if the searchers are a sufficiently attractive
source of revenue, then there is a competition effect which drives the quality
level of a free article up. This competition effect can be so strong that the
expected quality level of a free article can be sub-optimally high relative to
the first best.
6 Discussion and Extensions
The previous results can be used to provide guidance as to why quality levels
and pricing strategies differ across content areas in the online news industry.
Suppose that firms are split into distinct content areas, for example political,
entertainment and sports news, and that each content area makes decisions
over pricing and quality investments. α∗, x∗M and F (·) are now specific to
the content area in question. Consider the observation that the Financial
Times and The Wall Street Journal were amongst the first to use paywalls
because their customers place a high value on the financial news they provide
(Lanchester (2010)). It is also generally believed that the quality of the
articles these firms provide is relatively high. In contrast, it might be that
the valuation of entertainment news by customers is fairly low. In my model
this is equivalent to assuming that δfinance > δenter, implying that, ceteris
paribus, financial news firms are more likely to charge for access to their
articles. Additionally, although the quality level financial news firms charge
for will be higher, the expected quality level of free entertainment news will
be higher.
The model also highlights additional factors which might explain these
differences. For example, only a few firms provide specialist financial coverage
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whereas many provide some form of entertainment coverage, so nfinance <
nenter. Thus, it is more likely that there will be an equilibrium in which every
firm charges for access to financial news articles. Alternatively, it might be
that a lower proportion of consumers use aggregators to search for financial
news, so µfinance < µenter. This seems reasonable if we believe that consumers
interested in financial news are more likely to be regular news readers and
thus, loyal to a given firm. The same analysis can be used to explain why
firms are more likely to charge for access to editorial content (which is highly
valued by consumers) than for general news stories (which might have a lower
valuation).
I have focussed on the symmetric equilibrium of this model. However, it
is well understood that a continuum of asymmetric equilibria exist in this
class of model (Baye et al. (1992)). I will not attempt to provide a general
treatment of asymmetric equilibria here. However, I will make a number
of comments about such equilibria. Firstly, these asymmetric equilibria will
continue to exhibit cross-sectional heterogeneity in the pricing strategies and
quality investments of firms. The analysis is analogous to that of Baye et al.
(1992). Firms will continue to randomise between charging for access to
their articles and providing free access to them. At most one firm will always
provide free access, whilst multiple firms might always charge for access to
their articles.
Secondly, public broadcasters, who always provide their articles for free,
are a common feature of media markets in many countries. As described
above, the model does not explicitly incorporate a public broadcaster. How-
ever, it can be extended to do so using a simple example of an asymmetric
equilibrium. Suppose that there are n firms. n − 1 of these firms are pri-
vately owned and can choose whether to provide their article for free or to
charge for access. The nth firm is a public broadcaster who always provides
their articles for free. In all other respects this firm is identical to the other
firms. In particular, the public broadcaster is a profit maximiser, with mass
1−µ
n
of loyal consumers and earns per consumer revenue of β.10 If this is
the case, there is little change in the equilibrium outcome and the public
broadcaster uses its quality distribution to mimic the actions of the private
firms. The private firms still follow the symmetric strategy described by x∗M ,
α∗ and F (·) in Proposition 1. The quality distribution of the public broad-
caster is given by Fn(x) = 1 − α∗(1 − F (x)) and has a mass point at 0 of
10This can be thought of as either advertising revenue or public funding.
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Fn(0) = 1 − α∗. The inclusion of a public broadcaster, in this way, changes
none of the comparative statics or analysis presented above.
Finally, until now I have taken several aspects of consumer behaviour
as exogenous. Firstly, I assumed that the loyal consumers were evenly dis-
tributed across the n firms, rather than explicitly selecting who to consume
from. Secondly, I assumed that an exogenous fraction of consumers were
loyal consumers and there was no choice of whether to be a loyal consumer
or a searcher. I address each issue in turn.
A symmetric distribution of loyal consumers across the n firms could arise
from strategic behaviour in the following setup, due to Baye et al. (1992).
Continue to assume that an exogenous fraction 1− µ of consumers are loyal
consumers, who are willing to pay to access an article. Suppose that loyal
consumers and firms move simultaneously, with firms making their pricing
and quality decisions and loyal consumers deciding who to consume from.
After quality levels and pricing strategies have been made, searchers use
the aggregator to search amongst the providers. However, the aggregator
only presents the results for firms providing free access to their article and
searchers are unaware of the firms who charge for access to their article.11
A subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is for loyal consumers to
uniformly distribute themselves across the n firms, for the firms to follow the
symmetric strategy of Proposition 1, and for searchers to select the highest
quality free article.
Begin by considering the behaviour of searchers in any subgame. As
searchers are informed about quality levels, then their optimal behaviour in
any subgame is to select the highest quality free article. In the previous sub-
game, loyal consumers choose their firm and firms choose prices and quality
investments taking the subsequent behaviour of searchers as given. Given a
uniform distribution of the other loyal consumers across firms and the sym-
metric equilibrium being played by all other firms, no firm wants to deviate
from the symmetric strategy. Additionally, given the uniform distribution of
other consumers and the symmetric strategy of the firms, the expected utility
of a loyal consumer is the same across all firms. Thus, loyal consumers are
indifferent between all of the firms and do not want to deviate. Thus, there
is a Nash equilibrium from this subgame and we have a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the whole game.
Now consider the strategic decision of an individual whether to be a loyal
11So the paywall is like that of The Times.
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consumer or to be a searcher. Following Varian (1980), suppose that con-
sumer i faces a fixed cost ci of using the aggregator and becoming informed.
This cost might represent the time cost of going via the aggregator rather
than directly to the website of a firm. Once again, the aggregator is only
able to present the articles of those firms who provide free access. Suppose
that a proportion 1− µ of consumers have a search cost c¯ and proportion µ
have a search cost c. Then, a loyal consumer does not want to switch and
become a searcher and a searcher does not want to deviate and become a
loyal consumer if c¯ > E[Usearch]− E[Uloyal] > c.
These extensions begin to endogenise consumer behaviour within the cur-
rent model. However, a natural starting point for future work would be to
develop a model which fully endogenises the behaviour of consumers and
firms. Such a model would involve firms competing for both loyal consumers
and searchers on both quality and price and would allow individuals to decide
whether to be a searcher or a loyal consumer.
7 Conclusion
This article has developed a model of price and quality competition in the
online news industry, using a methodology commonly used to model price
dispersion in the market for a homogeneous good. In the symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium firms randomise in their pricing decisions and quality
investments. This endogenously generates heterogeneity in quality across, ex
ante identical, firms and is also consistent with the cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in pricing strategies that we observe. When applied in a dynamic
setting, this equilibrium strategy has similarities to the metered paywalls
currently used by some firms, which allow consumers to access some articles
for free but charge for access to others. I have used the model to analyse
how quality investments respond to a variety of factors, such as consumer
willingness to pay and advertising revenues, and how these responses differ
when firms use different pricing strategies.
The model’s predictions are consistent with a number of characteristics
of the online news industry. Firstly, it is never an equilibrium for every
firm to provide their article for free with certainty because this leads to
excessive competition which erodes away profits. This is consistent with the
recent movement away from universal free content provision. Secondly, the
model provides plausible explanations as to why strategies might differ across
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content areas. I focussed on the case of financial news because two major
players in this area, the Financial Times and The Wall Street Journal, have
had success charging for their articles. My model is consistent with the widely
held belief that this is because readers of these papers value the articles they
provide highly. However, my model also highlights a number of other factors
which may explain this outcome. In particular, the fact that there are a
relatively small number of specialist providers and it may be that readers are
more loyal to a given publication in this content area than elsewhere.
Finally, a distinctive feature of the online news industry is that aggre-
gators allow consumers to search and switch between providers and are an
important source of consumers for firms. I have shown that, as a greater
proportion of consumers use the aggregator, firms are more likely to provide
free access to their articles. Furthermore, I have been able to provide some
insights into the relationship between the importance of the aggregator and
consumer welfare. I have shown that both the expected quality level pro-
vided for free and the expected utility of some consumers are increasing in
the proportion of consumers using the aggregator. These results are in con-
trast to much of the recent policy debate which has focussed on the negative
effects aggregators and free content provision are believed to have had on
firm profits and the quality of articles.
8 Appendix
The remaining comparative static results omitted from Proposition 2 are:
Proposition 5.
i x∗M is decreasing with n and with γ.
ii α∗ is increasing with γ.
iii x¯, is increasing with β, with n and with µ but decreasing with δ. How-
ever, the effect of γ on x¯ is ambiguous.
iv E[pi(x)] is decreasing with n and with γ.
Proof of Propositions 2 and 5. A contradiction implies that x∗M is decreasing
with n. Suppose this were not the case and that x∗M was weakly increasing
with n. As n increases concavity of u(·) implies that the left hand side of (1)
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falls but the right hand side increases due to convexity of c(·). Therefore, the
first order condition could not hold for the hypothesised new x∗M and as a
result it must be the case that x∗M decreases in n. Analogous arguments imply
that x∗M is decreasing with γ and µ, is increasing with δ and is independent
of β.
The comparative statics for x¯, α∗ and E[pi(x)] use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M) − c(γx∗M) is decreasing with µ, with γ and with n,
is independent of β and increasing with δ.
Proof. Suppose that µ′ > µ. If the firm always sets pi = δu(xi) then x∗M(µ
′)
is still a feasible choice when the firm faces µ. If µ′ > µ then it is the case
that:
(1−µ′)δ
n
u(x∗M(µ
′))− c(γx∗M(µ′))
< (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M(µ
′))− c(γx∗M(µ′))
≤ (1−µ)δ
n
u(x∗M(µ))− c(γx∗M(µ))
where the final inequality follows because x∗M(µ) is the profit maximising
choice when faced by µ. The proofs for n, δ, γ and β are analogous.
The comparative static results forE[pi(x)] follow immediately from Lemma
2. The results for x¯ and α∗ follow from comparing the expressions (10) and
(11) respectively for δ′ > δ, and so forth, and applying Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Stochastic dominance requires that F (x;µ′) ≤ F (x;µ) ∀x
with strict inequality for some x whenever µ′ > µ.
Using (9) and (8):
F (x;µ) = 1−
 1
1−
(
(1−µ)δu(x∗M (µ))
nβµ
− c(γx∗M (µ))
βµ
) 1
n−1
×
(
1−
(
(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ))
βµn
+
c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ))
βµ
) 1
n−1
)
If κ = 1
βn
then this becomes:
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F (x;µ) = 1−
 1
1−
(
κ
(1−µ)δu(x∗M (µ))−nc(γx∗M (µ))
µ
) 1
n−1
×
(
1−
(
κ
(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n(c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ)))
µ
) 1
n−1
)
= 1− µ
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n(c(γx)− c[γx∗M(µ)])]}
1
n−1
µ
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ))− nc(γx∗M(µ))]}
1
n−1
Then the requirement that F (x;µ′) ≤ F (x;µ) becomes the requirement
that:
µ′
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n(c(γx)− c[γx∗M(µ′)])]}
1
n−1
µ′
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′))− nc(γx∗M(µ′))]}
1
n−1
≥ µ
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n(c(γx)− c[γx∗M(µ)])]}
1
n−1
µ
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ))− nc(γx∗M(µ))]}
1
n−1
⇒ µ
′ 1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ′))])}
1
n−1
µ
1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ))])}
1
n−1
≥ µ
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ))− nc(δx∗M(µ))]}
1
n−1
µ′
1
n−1 − {κ[(1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′))− nc(γx∗M(µ′))]}
1
n−1
(16)
The right hand side of this final expression is independent of x and label
the left hand side as:
g(x) =
µ′
1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ′))])}
1
n−1
µ
1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ))])}
1
n−1
then g(0) =
µ
′ 1n−1−{κ[(1−µ′)δu(x∗M (µ′))−nc(γx∗M (µ′))]}
1
n−1
µ
1
n−1−{κ[(1−µ)δu(x∗M (µ))−nc(γx∗M (µ))]}
1
n−1
. Thus a sufficient con-
dition for (16) to hold is that ∂g(x)
∂x
≥ 0 so that g(0) is the minimum of
g(x).
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It can be shown that ∂g(x)
∂x
≥ 0 requires that:
(
(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ))]
(1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ′))]
) 1
n−1−1
≥ µ
1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ))])}
1
n−1
µ′
1
n−1 − {κ((1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n[c(γx)− c(γx∗M(µ′))])}
1
n−1
(17)
The left hand side of (17) is greater than 1 if:
(1− µ)δ
n
u(x∗M(µ))− c(γx∗M(µ)) ≥
(1− µ′)δ
n
u(x∗M(µ
′))− c(γx∗M(µ′)) (18)
The right hand side of (17) is less than 1 if:
µ
1
n−1 − µ′ 1n−1 ≤ κ 1n−1
[
{(1− µ)δu(x∗M(µ)) + n(c(γx)− c[γx∗M(µ)])}
1
n−1
− {(1− µ′)δu(x∗M(µ′)) + n(c(γx)− c[γx∗M(µ′)])}
1
n−1
]
(19)
The left hand side of (19) is less than 0 because µ′ > µ thus a sufficient
condition for (19) to hold is that the right hand side is greater than 0. This
also requires that (18) holds. This condition holds from Lemma 2.
The proofs for β and δ are analogous.
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